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Abstract 
We study the conditions under which unconventional (balance-sheet) monetary policy can rule 
out self-fulfilling sovereign default in a model with optimizing but discretionary scale and monetary 
policymakers. When purchasing sovereign debt, the central bank effectively swaps risky 
government paper for monetary liabilities only exposed to inflation risk, thus yielding a lower 
interest rate. As central bank purchases reduce the (ex ante) costs of debt, we characterize a 
critical threshold beyond which, absent fundamental fiscal stress, the government strictly prefers 
primary surplus adjustment to default. Because default may still occur for fundamental reasons, 
however, the central bank faces the risk of losses on sovereign debt holdings, which may generate 
inefficient inflation. We show that these losses do not necessarily undermine the credibility of a 
backstop, nor the monetary authorities´ ability to pursue its inflation objectives. Backstops are 
credible if either the central bank enjoys fiscal backing or fiscal authorities are sufficiently averse 
to inflation. 
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[T]he proposition [is] that countries without a printing press
are subject to self-fullling crises in a way that nations that still
have a currency of their own are not."
Paul Krugman, The Printing Press Mystery, The conscience of a lib-
eral, August 17, 2011.
Public debt is in aggregate not higher in the euro area than in
the US or Japan. [T]he central bank in those countries could act
and has acted as a backstop for government funding. This is an
important reason why markets spared their scal authorities the
loss of condence that constrained many euro area governments
market access.
Mario Draghi, Luncheon Address: Unemployment in the Euro Area,
Jackson Hole Symposium, August 22, 2014.
1 Introduction
The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area and the launch of the Outright
Monetary Transactions (OMTs) program by the European Central Bank
(ECB) in September 2012 have revived the debate on the role of monetary
policy in shielding a country from belief-driven speculation in the sovereign
debt market.1 In the quote above, the ECB president Mario Draghi argues
that providing a backstop for government debt is among the functions nor-
mally performed by a central bank. This argument raises two crucial ques-
tions, namely: what are the instruments and mechanisms a central bank can
rely upon, to perform such a function successfully? Would providing a back-
stop to government debt necessarily compromise the central banks ability
to pursue its primary objectives of ination and macroeconomic stability?
The contribution of this paper consists of analyzing the core mecha-
nisms by which monetary authorities can rule out self-fullling sovereign
1As shown by Calvo (1988), self-fulling default is possible when, by determining the
equilibrium interest rate on public debt, agents expectations impact on the ex-post choices
by the scal and monetary authorities. If agents arbitrarily coordinate their expectations
on the anticipation of default on public debt, they will require a high sovereign interest
rate. Facing a high debt service, ex post, a discretionary government will choose to default
(partially or fully) on its liabilities, over the alternative of adjusting the primary surplus,
thus validating agentsexpectations. See also Lorenzoni and Werning (2014), and Ayres,
Navarro, Nicolini and Teles (2015); De Grauwe (2012) interprets the debt crisis in the euro
area as an instance of multiple equilibria.
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crises, relying on either conventional or unconventional monetary policies.
We specify a model in which welfare-maximizing scal and monetary au-
thorities optimally choose their policy under discretion. Ex post, the scal
authorities set taxes and may choose outright repudiation by imposing losses
(haircuts) on bond holders. Monetary authorities set ination generating
seigniorage and reducing the real value of debt. Hence default can occur
via haircuts and/or inationary debt debasement.2 In addition to pursuing
(conventional) ination policy, however, monetary authorities can engage in
(unconventional) balance sheet policy, through outright purchases of govern-
ment bonds. Whether via conventional or unconventional policy, the central
bank can be e¤ective in ruling out self-fullling sovereign default only if its
policies are credible, i.e., feasible and welfare-improving from the vantage
point of monetary policymakers.
We show that conventional monetary policy may enable a central bank
to a¤ect the range of debt over which the economy is vulnerable to belief-
driven default, but is generally insu¢ cient to eliminate multiplicity a point
also stressed by Aguiar, Amador, Farhi and Gopinath (2015) and Cooper
and Camous (2014).3 However, the scope for a successful backstop is en-
hanced by the use of unconventional balance sheet policies. At the core of
such policies is the ability of a central bank to issue nominal liabilities at a
lower interest rate than a government subject to default risk. Central bank
liabilities currency and reserves, possibly interest-bearing are claims to
cash: monetary authorities stand ready to honor them by redeeming them
at their nominal value in our model, we assume that they do so under any
circumstances (see Bassetto and Messer 2013, Del Negro and Sims 2014 and
Hall and Reis 2015). So, when purchasing government paper while simul-
taneously issuing currency and reserves, the central bank e¤ectively swaps
government debt, possibly subject to outright default, for own liabilities
2The empirical evidence suggests that domestic default (usually but not necessarily in
conjunction with default on external debt) tends to occur under extreme macroeconomic
duress see, e.g., Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011). Relying on a large sample of countries, these
authors document that output declines by 4 percent and ination rises to 170 percent on
average, in the year a country defaults on domestic debt.
3Under steeply increasing costs of ination, conventional policy relying on ex-post debt
debasement works under stringent conditions. In Aguiar, Amador, Farhi and Gopinath
(2015), for instance, these conditions include a lengthening of the maturity of public debt,
so that debasement can be accomplished via sustained but moderate ination over time
essentially, smoothing the costs of ination debasement across periods. In Cooper and
Camous (2014), these conditions include the central banks ability to pre-commit to high
ination when self-fullling expectations of default materialize.
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with a guaranteed face value, hence subject only to the risk of ination.4
Because of the implied interest di¤erential, central bank interventions in the
debt market contain the overall cost of debt service, altering the trade-o¤s
faced by a discretionary scal authority in favor of adjusting the primary
surplus (rather than choosing outright default). Indeed, we show that, con-
ditional on market investors requiring a high interest rate to nance the
government driven by expectations of default not justied by fundamentals,
there is a minimum scale of central bank interventions at which outright de-
fault becomes a welfare-dominated option and is therefore avoided by scal
policymakers.
Yet, even if a backstop policy is successful to rule out belief-driven
crises, default may still occur ex-post due to adverse realizations of the
fundamentals raising the risk of losses on the central bank balance sheet.5
To the extent that these losses make it impossible for the central bank to
honor its own liabilities without deviating substantially from its optimal in-
ation plans, monetary authorities become reluctant to intervene ex ante.
The risk of losses thus calls into question the credibility of the backstop.
In our model, whether prospective losses undermine the backstop strat-
egy, crucially depends on the interactions between scal and monetary au-
thorities. If the government accepts to make contingent transfers to the
central bank, i.e., the scal authority provides scal backingto monetary
policy (as in the analysis by Del Negro and Sims 2014), prospective losses
do not compromise the credibility of the backstop. The central bank can
always pursue the optimal ination plans, whereby ination is lower under
the backstop than under self-fullling default.
Conversely, if the two authorities operate under strict budget separation
the central bank is required to be solely responsible for its own balance
sheet debt purchases unavoidably create ination risk, which in turn raises
the output distortions and welfare costs associated with a backstop. Para-
doxically, however, the inationary consequences of balance sheet losses in
case of default may strengthen the e¤ectiveness of the backstop. This is so
when scal and monetary authorities share the same objective function or
4See Gertler and Karadi (2012) for a similar notion of unconventional monetary policy
applied to outright purchases of private assets.
5A key feature that qualies our contribution to the literature is that we model fun-
damental default in addition to belief-driven crises. A proper discussion of the credibility
of unconventional backstop policy is not possible in model economies where default ex-
clusively results from self-fullling expectations. Ruling out prospective losses from fun-
damental default by assumption, central bank interventions in the debt market carried
out on a su¢ cient scale eliminate default altogether, and with it any risk of having to
run the printing press ine¢ ciently.
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more in general if the scal authorities are su¢ ciently averse to ination, so
that they internalize the e¤ects of own policy choices on the overall distor-
tions. Intuitively, with strict budget separation, the high ination stemming
from the monetization of large losses adds to the welfare costs of default,
altering the trade-o¤s faced by the scal authorities in favor of servicing the
outstanding public debt in full.
Our analysis has relevant implications for policy in light of two often-
voiced concerns. On the one hand, it is argued that the central bank may not
have the ability to expand its balance sheet on a su¢ cient scale to e¤ectively
backstop government debt. On the other hand, it is argued that large-scale
purchases of government debt unavoidably force monetary authorities to
accept high ination rates, even when the backstop is successful in ruling out
belief-driven crises. Our results suggest that an e¤ective backstop neither
has to match the full scale of the government nancing, nor has to guarantee
the government in all circumstances at the cost of high ination.
While our framework builds upon Calvo (1988), our model and results
are related to a vast and growing literature on self-fullling debt crises, most
notably Cole and Kehoe (2002) and more recently Lorenzoni and Werning
(2014) and Nicolini et al. (2015), as well as to the literature on sovereign
default and sovereign risk, see e.g. Arellano (2008) and Uribe (2006) among
others. Jeanne (2012) and Roch and Uhlig (2011) analyze the role of an
external lender of last resort. Cooper (2012) and Tirole (2015) study debt
guarantees and international bailouts in a currency union. With the excep-
tion of Uribe (2006), these contributions focus on real (indexed) government
debt.
A few recent papers and ours complement each other in the analysis of
sovereign default and monetary policy. In a dynamic framework, Aguiar,
Amador, Farhi and Gopinath (2015) analyze a similar problem as in our
paper with optimizing scal and monetary authorities, focusing on (conven-
tional) ination policies, rather than (unconventional) balance sheet policies.
The conventional policies in their paper lower the governments borrowing
costs ex post, after debt has been issued at high interest rates. The un-
conventional policies we study in our paper, instead, lower borrowing costs
ex-ante, at the time of debt issuance. Bacchetta, Perazzi and Van Win-
coop (2015) introduce the sovereign default model of Lorenzoni and Werning
(2014) in a new-Keynesian framework with short- and long-term debt and
exogenous monetary and scal rules. These authors, like us, study conven-
tional and unconventional (balance sheet) monetary policy in analyzing
the latter, however, they focus exclusively on the case of zero interest rate
policies. Similarly to us, but assuming exogenous monetary and scal rules,
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Reis (2013) examines the inationary consequences of a monetary backstop
by modeling the central bank balance sheet, and interest-bearing, default-
free monetary liabilities (the new style central banking).6
The text is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model econ-
omy, and Section 3 characterizes equilibrium multiplicity under conventional
monetary policy. Section 4 derives and discusses our main results concerning
monetary backstops. Section 5 concludes.
2 A model of self-fullling sovereign crises and
monetary policy
In this section we describe the model, discuss policy instruments and dis-
tortions, and characterize the optimal scal and monetary strategies. As
in Calvo (1988), we study the mechanism by which, given the government
nancing needs, outright default is precipitated by agentsexpectations, and
develop our analysis in a two-period economy framework.
2.1 The model setup
Consider a two-period endowment economy, populated by a continuum of
identical risk-neutral agents who derive utility from consuming in period 2
only. Initially, in period 1, agents are endowed with a stock of nancial
wealth W , which they can invest in three assets: public debt, B, central
bank liabilities H (if any are issued), and a safe asset K. In period 2, they
receive a random output realization, and the payo¤s from their assets; they
pay taxes and consume. The economy can be in one of three states, High,
6The working of a monetary backstop is most easily understood referring to a situation
in which the (risk-free) nominal interest rate is at its lower bound. In this case, studied by
Bacchetta, Perazzi and Van Wincoop (2015), the central bank is able to issue at money
at will and buy government paper, without any impact on current prices. These purchases
reduce the cost of servicing the debt and thus eliminate any vulnerability to self-fullling
crises (as at money is subject only to ination risk). However, to avoid undesirable
ination developments, appropriate scal and monetary policies are required in the future
to deal with the increased money stock. Our model of unconventional monetary policy
can be viewed as an extension to the case in which central bank liabilities are issued at
the equilibrium interest rate  namely, at a rate consistent with expectations of future
ination. Also in this case, the central bank can expand its balance sheet by issuing
interest-bearing monetary liabilities (that will always be convertible into cash/at money
at face value), with no immediate inationary consequences. As discussed below, it will
do so only upon fully accounting for the implications of its purchases on the future choice
of primary surpluses, in turn a¤ecting its ability to shrink its balance sheet and withdraw
monetary liabilities from the market without compromising its ination objectives.
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Average, or Low (H;A;L), occurring with (strictly positive) probability
1  ;  and  (1  ), respectively.
Fiscal and monetary authorities are both benevolent they maximize the
same objective function given by the utility of the representative agent but
act under discretion and independently of each other. In the rst period, the
scal authority (the government) faces an exogenously given nancing need
equal to B, and issues bonds at the market-determined nominal rate RB.7
The monetary authority may decide to purchase a share ! 2 [0; 1] of the
outstanding debt at some policy rate RB which may di¤er from the market
rate. To nance its debt purchases, the central bank issues interest bearing
liabilities H = !B; at the risk-free nominal rate R: So, out of total debt,
(1  !)B is held by private investors, !B is on the central bank balance
sheet. Consumerswealth in the rst period is thus equal toW = (1  !)B+
K+H, where the safe asset, supplied with innite elasticity, pays a constant
real rate, denoted by :
In the second period, taking interest rates and central bank policy as
given, the scal authority sets taxes T and may choose to impose a haircut
i 2 [0; 1] on bond holders, including the central bank. By the same token,
taking interest rates and scal policy as given, the monetary authority sets
ination i and makes good on any liability it may have, paying RH to
private investors.
2.1.1 Policy instruments and distortions
The instruments of scal policy Taxation (primary surplus) and de-
fault induce distortions that a¤ect net output and may aggravate the budget.
Taxation results in a dead-weight loss of output indexed by z (Ti; Yi), where
from now on a subscript i will refer to the output state i = H;A;L:8 The
7As long as the initial nancial need of the government is given, it is immaterial whether
we follow Calvos specication or we model discount bonds see Lorenzoni and Werning
(2014). The set of equilibria would instead be di¤erent in a model after Cole and Kehoe
(2000), where multiplicity arises via discretionary default on the initial stock of liabilities.
8 It can be easily shown that the function z () corresponds to the distortions caused by
income taxes on the allocation in an economy with an endogenous labor supply. In general,
while we encompass trade-o¤s across di¤erent distortions in a reduced-form fashion, in
doing so we draw on a vast literature, ranging from the analysis of the macroeconomic
costs of ination in the Kydland-Prescott but especially in the new-Keynesian tradition
(see e.g. Woodford 2003), to the analysis of the trade-o¤s inherent in inationary nancing
(e.g. Barro 1983), or the role of debt in shaping discretionary monetary and scal policy
(e.g. Diaz, Giovannetti, Marimon and Teles 2008 and Martin 2009), and, last but not
least, the commitment versus discretion debate in public policy (e.g. Persson and Tabellini
1993).
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function z (:) is convex in Ti; satisfying standard regularity conditions. We
realistically assume that, to raise a given level of tax revenue, the lower the
realization of output, the larger the dead-weight losses, and the faster these
losses grow in Ti, that is:
z (T ;YL) > z (T ;YA) > z(T ;YH); (1)
z0 (T ;YL) > z0 (T ;YA) > z0(T ;YH):
Since what matters in our analysis is the size of the primary surplus, rather
than the individual components of the budget, for simplicity we posit that
government spending is constant at the non-defaultable level G, and use
taxation and primary surplus interchangeably. Also for notational simplicity,
when unambiguous, we will write the function z (Ti;Yi) omitting the output
argument, z (Ti) :
Sovereign default may entail di¤erent types of costs, associated with a
contraction of economic activity and transaction costs in the repudiation
of government liabilities. In the theoretical literature, some contributions
(see e.g. Arellano 2008 and Cole and Kehoe 2000) posit that a default
causes output to contract by a xed amount. In other contributions (see e.g.
Calvo 1988), the cost of default falls on the budget and is commensurate
to the extent of the loss imposed on investors. While the relative weight
of di¤erent default costs is ultimately an empirical matter (see e.g. Cruces
and Trebesch 2013), alternative assumptions are consequential for policy
trade-o¤s and the properties of equilibria as shown below, multiplicity of
well-behaved equilibria can only arise with xed costs; with variable costs,
the equilibrium rate of default responds to central bank interventions. For
these reasons, we prefer not to restrict our model to one type of costs only.
Rather, we posit that outright default in period 2 entails a loss of  units of
output regardless of the size of default and the state of the economy,9 and
aggravate the budget in proportion to the size of default. Upon defaulting,
the government incurs a nancial outlay equal to a fraction  2 (0; 1) of the
total size of default on private agents i (1  !)BRB. The costs of defaulting
on the central bank are discussed below.10
9The xed component of the cost squares well with the presumption that the decision
to breach government contracts, even with a small haircut, marks a discontinuity in the
e¤ects of such policy on economic activity. As we show below, e¤ectively this assumption
entails that there is a minimum threshold for the haircut  applied by the government
under default.
10Calvo (1988) motivates variable costs of default stressing legal and transaction fees
associated to debt repudiation. In a broader sense, one could include disruption of nancial
intermediaries (banks and pension funds) that may require government support. Note that
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The instruments of monetary policy Ination has also distortionary
e¤ects on economic activity, that we assume to be isomorphic to those of
taxation: it causes a loss of output according to a convex function C (i).
Without loss of generality, we normalize this function such that C (0) =
C 0 (0) = 0 a standard instance being C () =

2
2: For simplicity, as in
Calvo (1988), we assume that ination in period 2 generates seigniorage
revenue according to the function
Seigniorage =
i
1 + i
: (2)
where a constant  implies that there is no La¤er curve.11
In addition to setting ination in period 2, monetary authorities have the
option to purchase government debt by issuing interest-bearing reserves
in period 1. This option captures a key institutional development in modern
central banking, concerning the distinction between conventional (ination)
policy and unconventional (balance-sheet) policy. To pursue the latter, the
central bank crucially relies on the ability to expand its liabilities in line with
its preferred ination path (see Reis 2013). In our model, we posit that, in
period 1, the central bank issues monetary liabilities without a¤ecting the
initial price level, bearing an equilibrium interest rate fully consistent with
its discretionary choice of ination (the conventional monetary instrument)
in period 2.12
2.1.2 Budget constraints of the scal and the monetary authority
In order to write the budget constraint of the government and the central
bank, there are at least three interrelated issues that need to be addressed.
These concern whether (i) a government that opts to default is able/willing
our results would go through if the variable costs of default were in output units, rather
than a¤ecting the budget. The main di¤erence would be that the perceived marginal
benet of default for the scal authority would be 1 instead of 1   ; the marginal cost
would remain equal to :
11We refer to the specication in Calvo (1988), who restricts the demand for (non-
interest bearing) at money to the case of a constant velocity, and abstracts from specifying
a terminal condition. Note that our setup can be easily generalized to encompass an
ination La¤er curve, making  a decreasing function of ination.
12See footnote 6. In dynamic monetary models, buying government debt by increasing
the money stock does not necessarily result in higher current ination, as the latter mainly
reects future money growth (see, e.g., Diaz, Giovannetti, Marimon and Teles 2008 and
Martin 2009, placing this consideration at the heart of their analysis of time inconsistency
in monetary policy).
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to discriminate between private investors and monetary authorities, applying
di¤erent haircuts; (ii) defaulting on the central bank generates budget costs
and (iii) the central bank can receive scal transfer, i.e., in the denition by
Del Negro and Sims (2014), the bank can rely on a scal backing.
The rst two issues have no substantial implications for our analysis.
For clarity of exposition and analytical convenience, we assume that, rst,
the government applies the same haircut i rate to all debt holders, corre-
sponding to a pari passu clause in government paper; second, the budget
cost of defaulting on the central bank is isomorphic, but not necessarily
identical, to the costs of defaulting on the private investors we stipulate
1 >  > CB  0: Under a pari passu rule, and allowing for 0  CB  ,
the budget constraint of the scal authority reads:
Ti G = [1  i (1  )] RB
1 + i
(1  !)B+[1  i (1  CB)] RB
1 + i
!B Ti
(3)
where RB is the market interest rate at which agents buy the share of
government debt (1  !)B not purchased by the central bank, RB is the
intervention rate at which the central bank purchases bonds, and Ti denotes
transfers from the central bank to the scal authority in state i. The budget
constraint of the central bank in the second period is:
Ti = i
1 + i
+
(1  i)RB
1 + i
!B   R
1 + i
H = (4)
=
i
1 + i
+

(1  i)RB
1 + i
  R
1 + i

!B:
The third issue scal backing is instead quite consequential. If the
constraint on scal transfers to the central bank (if any) is either relaxed
or not binding, the two budget constraints of the authorities can be consol-
idated as follows:
Ti  G+ i
1 + i
 = (5)
[1  i (1  )]RB
1 + i
(1  !)B +

R
1 + i
+
CBiRB
1 + i

!B:
The consolidated budget above claries that, no matter how large the in-
crease in the central bank balance sheet (!B) in period 1 is, a large enough
primary surplus (net of the ex post interest bill of the government) allows
the central bank to redeem its nominal liabilities from the market in period
9
2, without impinging on the desired level of ination. Conversely, if trans-
fers to the central bank are ruled out by (an unbreakable) rule (i.e., Ti  0
always), by (4) it is apparent that monetary authorities will have to ensure
repayment of their liabilities by raising seigniorage:
i+
 
(1  i)RB  R

!B = 0:
So, if the central bank intervenes in the sovereign debt market and exposes
its balance sheet to default risk, the need to make up for ex-post losses
will weigh on monetary policy decisions. Honoring the outstanding stock
of nominal liabilities H at face value will require monetary authorities to
run a rate of ination large enough to satisfy the above constraint in all
circumstances.
In advanced countries, budget interactions between the scal and mone-
tary authorities are regulated by institutional rules that typically hold cen-
tral banks responsible for backing their own liabilities constraining the
modalities and the size of scal transfers to the central bank. These insti-
tutional constraints on transfers, however, are not always binding. Indeed,
they tend to be relaxed precisely in exceptional crisis circumstances when
the scal authorities may be especially concerned with the possibility that
balance sheet losses could condition monetary policy. In light of these con-
siderations, we nd it important to analyze monetary backstops under either
scenario of scal backing and budget separation.
2.2 Optimality conditions
In this subsection, we characterize the optimal debt pricing by the risk
neutral consumers in the economy in period 1, and the policy plan set by
the scal and monetary authorities under discretion in period 2.
2.2.1 Debt pricing by risk neutral agents
Under risk neutrality, the utility of the representative agent coincides with
consumption in period 2:
Ui = Yi   z (Ti;Yi)  Ti   i
1 + i
+ (6)
KR+
(1  i)RB
1 + i
(1  !)B + R
1 + i
H  C (i) ;
where, ex post, the net real asset payo¤s are determined by the realization
of default and ination. Ex ante, the expected real returns on government
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bonds are equalized to the constant, safe return on the real asset:
RB

(1  ) 1  H
1 + H
+ 


1  A
1 + A
+ (1  ) 1  L
1 + L

= : (7)
The interest parity condition pins down the price of government debt as a
function of both expected default and expected ination rates.
When both B and H are traded, there is a second equilibrium interest
parity condition. To generate a demand for reserves, which we assume to
be free from the risk of outright default, the interest rate R o¤ered by the
central bank must be equal to the real rate  adjusted by expected ination:
R

1  
1 + H
+ 


1 + A
+
(1  )
1 + L

= : (8)
In equilibrium, the interest rate on government debt must exceed the interest
paid on central banks liabilities by the expected rate of default.
2.2.2 Optimal discretionary plans for ination, taxation and de-
fault
The two authorities independently maximize the same objective function,
given by (6), subject to the consolidated budget constraint (5) (with multi-
plier ), and the constraint Ti  0 on the central bank budget (with multi-
plier CB  0). In doing so, they take as given (i) the rates of return on all
assets set in period 1, (ii) the scale of interventions by the central bank in pe-
riod 1, and (iii) each other instruments. As, from the perspective of each pol-
icy authority, the solution to the policy problem identies best responses
to the policy set by the other authority and to private sector expectations,
below we will denote the optimal discretionary plan for ination, taxation
and default with the superscript , that is: i = i
 
RB; B;R; !;RB

;
T i = Ti
 
RB; B;R; !;RB

and i = i
 
RB; B;R; !;RB

.
The plans in general The scal authority will choose to default when
the welfare(=consumption) gains from reducing distortionary taxation after
the implementation of an optimal haircut exceeds the xed and variable
costs of default, net of output losses due to ination:
Ui (

i > 0)  Ui (i = 0) : (9)
Above, utility is assessed conditional on the optimal plans for taxation and
ination given the government decision to either default (on the left hand
side), or service its debt in full (on the right hand side).
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As regards the optimal scal plan, under optimal default the constraint
on the admissible haircut rate i 2 (0; 1] may/may not be binding. If the
constraint is not binding, the optimal taxation plan obeys the following rst
order condition of the scal authority:
z0 (T i ;Yi) =
 (1  !)RB +
 
CB + 
CB
i
  !RB
(1  ) (1  !)RB   CB!RB
; (10)
In an interior solution, the scal authorities set taxes trading o¤ the output
costs of distortionary taxation, with the benets of reducing the haircut
rates so to contain the budget (variable) costs of default. Note that, when
the central bank budget constraint is binding (the multiplier CBi is strictly
positive), a government that cares about ination will tend to set higher
taxes and reduce the optimal haircut rate, so to contain the inationary
consequences of losses on the central bank balance sheet. Given the optimal
T i , the optimal haircut rate 

i is then obtained from the budget constraint
of the government (3). If the constraint i 2 (0; 1] is binding, under optimal
default the government imposes a 100 percent haircut on bond holders, and
sets taxation T i to satisfy the budget constraint (3) evaluated at 

i = 1:
Similarly, under no default, the government adjusts taxation T i to service
its liabilities in full. In this case, the relevant budget constraint is (5),
evaluated at i = 0.
As regards the optimal ination plan, the rst order condition of the
monetary authority problem is:
(1 + i )
2 C0 (i ) = z0 (Ti;Yi) [+ (1  !)BRB +R!B] (11)
+ i

z0 (Ti;Yi)
  (1  ) (1  !)BRB + CBRB!B
+ (1  !)BRB +

CBRB

!B

+ CBi 

+
 
(1  i)RB  R

!B

;
The central bank sets ination by trading o¤ its costs with the output ben-
ets from reducing distortionary income taxation net of the costs of default
(if any). Under discretion, the monetary authorities will always choose a
non-negative rate of ination even if printing money generates no seignior-
age revenue ( = 0). This is because a discretionary monetary authority
will not resist the temptation to inate nominal debt, if only moderately
so (according to the condition above). Positive and rapidly rising costs of
ination nonetheless prevent policymakers from attempting to wipe away
the debt with a bout of very high ination. Note that, in state of the world
in which there is no default (for i = 0), the constraint on the central bank
budget never binds (CB = 0).
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Overall, since policymakers are benevolent and share the same objective
function, the optimal plan described above minimizes the joint distortions
induced by taxation and default on the one hand, and ination on the other
hand. In general, policymakers will want to use all available instruments
ruling out an uneven resort to extreme ination as a substitute for outright
default.
For notational clarity, from now on we will distinguish variables across
the cases of interior default as opposed to complete default, using a hat
^, and a tildee, respectively. To keep complexity at a minimum, we also
abstract from budget costs of default on central bank holdings of sovereign
bonds, setting CB = 0.
The case of a consolidated budget constraint in detail To gain
insight on the above plans, we nd it useful to provide a close-up analysis
of the case of a consolidated budget constraint, i.e. CBi = 0. This will
be an endogenous outcome in Section 3 below, when there are no central
bank interventions, and a maintained hypothesis implied by scal backing
in Section 4.1.
When CBi = 0, in the case of an interior default, (10) simplies to:
z0
bT i ;Yi = z0 bTi;Yi = 1  : (12)
implying that taxation does not depend on ination and agentsexpectations
so that we can drop the best-response superscript . Likewise, the condition
for the optimal ination plan (11):
(1 + b)2 C0 (b) = 
1   [+ (1  !)BRB + !BR] (13)
shows that b is constant across states of the world. Given bTi, the optimal
default rate is derived from the consolidated budget constraint:
bi = (1  !)BRB + !RB   (1 + b)
bTi  G  b
(1  ) (1  !)BRB :
In the case of complete default, taxation eT i is set to satisfy the consoli-
dated budget constraint:
eT i = G  ei1 + ei + RB1 + ei (1  !)B + R1 + ei !B;
13
and is always state contingent. So is the ination plan, determined by:
(1 + ei )2 C0 (ei ) = z0 eT i  [+  (1  !)BRB + !BR] +  (1  !)BRB;
For the case of an interior solution for the haircut rate, the optimal
outright default condition (9) becomes
 + z
bTi+ C (b) + bi RB1 + b (1  !)B  z (T i ) + C (i ) : (14)
Written with an equality sign, the above condition can be solved for the
minimum default rate which the government nds optimal in each state of
the world, denoted by i. Because of the xed output costs , optimal
default only occurs at strictly positive rates, hence i > 0. If an interior
solution does not exist, bi , T^i; and b in (14) are replaced with 1, eT i ; ei ,
and the default condition reads:
If bi > 1 : +z eT i +C (ei )+ RB1 + ei (1  !)B  z (T i )+C (i ) :
(15)
Note that, since
z0( eT i )  = (1  ) : (16)
taxes (and tax distortions) under full default cannot be lower than taxes
under partial default, namely eT i  T^i:
2.3 Regularity conditions
In the rest of the paper, we will dene and analyze the equilibrium across
di¤erent possible policy scenarios, allowing for either conventional or un-
conventional monetary policy or both (Sections 3 and 4), with and without
scal backing(Subsections 4.1 and 4.2). We will present our results both
analytically and resorting to numerical examples.
In spite of its stylized nature, the model in its general form admits many
equilibria, not all of interest for an analysis of monetary backstops. Be-
fore proceeding, we set conditions under which fundamental default may or
may not occur in the badstate L, but there is no fundamental reason for
defaulting in the relatively goodstates A;H. Moreover, we would like to
study equilibria that are well-behaved, i.e., stable by the Walrasian criterion
discussed, e.g., by Lorenzoni and Werning (2014). By this criterion, a small
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increase in the supply of government bonds should not decrease the interest
rate charged by the markets.13
Below we spell out two assumptions such that our model admits a well-
dened (stable) equilibrium with
1. no default for a su¢ ciently low initial B;
2. full default in state L and no default in the other states for intermediate
levels of B;
3. full default in L and partial default in A; for a su¢ ciently high B.
We refer to the above as the ND (no-default) equilibrium, the D (default
in L) equilibrium, and the DD (default in L and A) equilibrium. In each
equilibrium, we will denote variables with the corresponding superscript
ND;D and DD.
The rst assumption establishes a reasonable ordering between the pri-
mary surplus under interior default in the high (H) state and the average
(A) state, and stipulates that both must be larger than required to service
the maximum level of debt sustainable in a state of scal stress (L) at the
real risk free rate , denoted by BL: The second assumption restricts the
probability of the state (H) in which bond holders are paid in full to be
large enough, and the probability of the intermediate state (A) not to be
too large.
Assumption 1. The primary surplus under interior default across
states of the world satises the following restrictions:
BL < (1  )
bTA  G = < bTA  G = < bTH  G = (17)
Assumption 2. The probabilities of state H, 1 , and of state A, ,
are such that:
1   > ; (18)
1 + ^DD
1 + DDH
>  > 0:
13 In (Walrasian-)unstable equilibria, such as the one discussed by Calvo (1988), the
economy is vulnerable to self-fullling crisis for small levels (but not for high levels) of debt,
and the sovereign rates are decreasing in the stock of debt. In an analysis of backstops,
interventions by the central bank should be negative, i.e., the central bank should actually
sell government debt in response to the threat of a run on debt. By the same argument
set forth by Lorenzoni and Werning (2014), in what follows we will abstract from these
equilibria, on the ground that they have pathological and unpalatable implications for
policy.
15
where the superscript DD refers to the third equilibrium above. Note that
the last condition above is always satised in two cases: rst, if i ! 0 for
all i which is the case when either policymakers are extremely averse to
ination, or when debt is real (indexed) and seigniorage is zero; second, if
policy distortions are such that ination in state H remains su¢ ciently low
even for levels of sovereign debt that lead the government to default in both
L and A, so that DDH  ^DD.14
A third assumption that the primary surplus in state L is at most zero
when seigniorage revenue is at its maximum  is imposed for the sake of
analytical tractability
Assumption 3: bTL  G+ ! 0: (19)
As shown below, this implies that that, if the government optimally chooses
to default in the low state, the haircut will always be 100 percent. This last
assumption will be relaxed in our numerical examples.
3 Ination and macroeconomic resilience to self-
fullling crises
We start our study of monetary policy in economies vulnerable to self-
fullling debt crises restricting the central bank to rely exclusively on con-
ventional policies, i.e. the central bank only sets ination and ! = 0. As
stressed by Calvo (1988), some degree of stealth repudiationis a natural
outcome in an economy in which public liabilities are denominated in nomi-
nal terms, because unexpected changes in ination rates a¤ect their ex-post
real returns. In our model, indeed, repudiation in period 2 can take the form
of either outright default on the nominal value of debt, or ination surprises
reducing the real value of debt, or both.15
In this section, we will rst characterize the properties of the optimal in-
ation plans and dene the equilibrium. Second, we will discuss equilibrium
multiplicity. We will show that in general conventional ination policy does
not rule out belief-driven outright default via haircuts on bond holders. Yet
14 It is important to note that (18) does not rule out the existence of other, not well-
behaved, equilibria, i.e., our model may admit equilibria that are unstableby the Wal-
rasian criterion, coexisting with the stable ones on which we focus our analysis.
15This is di¤erent from Calvo (1988), where default is implemented alternatively through
outright repudiation (in the real version of the model), or ination only (in the monetary
version).
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convex costs of ination will prevent self-fullling expectations of stealth
repudiationvia inationary debt debasement à la Calvo.
3.1 Properties of the optimal ination plans
We have seen that, under discretion, government spending will be nanced
at least in part through seigniorage and some debasement of outstanding
(ex-default) public liabilities, so that ination rates will always be positive
in equilibrium. Then (with ! = 0) under our assumptions the central bank
budget constraint never binds and CB = 0.
For convenience, we summarize the optimal policy plans in Table 1 below.
In the table, the equation (28) that denes the minimum (interior) haircut
rate at which the government optimally defaults, i, is obtained from the
default condition (14) by setting bi = i; and using the fact that, for ! = 0,
the cost of debt issuance can be written as16
BRB =
(1 + ^)

T^i  G

+ ^
1  bi (1  ) > 0. (20)
According to the table: under the optimal default plan with an interior
haircut rate, i  bi  1; ination is identical across states of the world,
i.e., bA = bL = b see the conditions (22) and (23).17 If the constraintbi  1 is binding and default is complete, ination plans are instead state
dependent, as taxes and seigniorage will have to adjust to cover current non-
interest expenditure according to (24) and (25). The same applies under no
outright default (i = 0), whereas the revenue from taxation and seigniorage
needs to adjust according to (26) and (27) to nance the government real
expenditure and interest bill in full. Note that, in either corner solution for
default, i and ei always comove positively with T i and eT i , hence ination
inherits the same properties as taxation. For this reason, the condition (16)
on taxation implies that output distortions due to ination under full default
cannot be lower than under partial default.
16When (28) is satised for a i exceeding 100 percent (as is the case if the primary
surplus under interior default

T^i  G

+^= (1 + ^) is non-positive) the government opts
for complete default.
17This property of the optimal ination rate depends on the simplifying assumption
that the cost of ination does not vary with the state of the world. It would be easy to
relax this assumption, at the cost of cluttering the notation without much gain in terms
of economic intuition.
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The expressions in the table highlight several properties of ination of
particular interest for our analysis. As stated in the following lemma, in-
ation rates are increasing in the ex-ante interest rate RB and the stock
of debt B. At either corner solution for the default rate, i = f0; 1g ; the
better the state of the economy, the lower the ination rates (and taxation).
Table 1
                              
If 1  bi = 11  
241  (1 + b)

T^i  G

+ b
BRB
35  i > 0 : (21)
i =
bi T i = bTi = z0 1  1  ;Yi (22)
and (1 + b)2 C0 (b) = 1  (+BRB) (23)
If bi > 1 : i = 1 eT i = G+  RB1+ei B   ei1+ei 
(24)
and (1 + ei )2 C0 (ei ) = z0( eT i ) (+ BRB) + BRB (25)
If bi < i : i = 0 T i = RB1+i B +G  i1 + i  (26)
and (1 + i )
2 C0 (i ) = z0(T i ) (+BRB) (27)
i solves  = z
0@G  i
1 + i
+
1 + ^
1 + i

T^i  G

+ ^1+^
1  i (1  )
1A  z T^i
(28)
+C (i )  C (^)  i

T^i  G

+ ^1+^
1  i (1  )
.
                              
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Lemma 1 Ination best responses (i ; ^; ei ) are i) increasing in the ex-
pected sovereign rate RB and the stock of debt B, where ^  ei ; ii) such
that (i ; ei ) > j ; ej  if z (;Yi) > z (;Yj), while ^ is constant across
states.
Omitting a formal proof, we note that these properties are intuitive in
light of our assumption of convex costs of ination, C (i ) ; which translates
into decreasing marginal benets from its use. Property i) follows from
inspection of the ination reaction function, rewritten here in general form:
(1 + i )
2 C0 (i ) = z0(T i ) (+BRB) + i BRB

  z0(T i ) (1  )

(29)
In this expression, the right-hand-side is increasing in RBB; since taxes are
weakly increasing in the interest rate bill. Moreover, by (16), taxes under
full default are at least as high as taxes under partial default ( eT i  T^i).
Property ii) descends directly from our ordering of tax distortions z (;Yi)
across states, stipulating that distortions are worse then the fundamentals
are weaker.
3.2 Equilibrium
A rational-expectation equilibrium is dened by the pricing condition (7),
together with the consolidated budget constraint (5) with ! = 0, the optimal
tax rates either (22), or (24), or (26) , given the default threshold (28),
and the optimal ination rate either (23) or (25) or (27).
By assumption 3, (28) implies that in equilibrium there will be either
no default or complete default in state L. Partial default will instead be a
possibility in the A state whereas the interior optimal rate bDDA in the DD
equilibrium is given by:
bDDA = B 
h
(1  ) 1+bDD
1+DDH
+ 
i h
T^A  G

+ bDD
1+bDD 
i
(1  )B  
h
T^A  G

+ bDD
1+bDD 
i  DDA > 0:
(30)
Under the assumptions above, the sovereign interest rates RjB and the risk-
free nominal rates Rj in the equilibrium j = ND;D;DD are as follows:
RNDB = R
ND = 

(1  )
1 + NDH
+ 


1 + NDA
+
(1  )
1 + NDL
 1
(31)
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RDB = 

(1  )
1 + DH
+

1 + DA
 1
> RD = 

(1  )
1 + DH
+ 


1 + DA
+
(1  )
1 + eDL
 1
(32)
RDDB = 
(
(1  )
1 + DDH
+ 
1  bDDA
1 + bDD
) 1
> RDD = 

(1  )
1 + DDH
+ 


1 + bDD + (1  )1 + eDDL
 1
(33)
where ination rates are determined according to (25) in states with full
default (i.e. state L in the D and DD equilibria); according to (27) in states
with partial default (namely state A in the DD equilibrium), and according
to (23) in (all other) states with no default. Note that the risk-free nominal
rate is not the same across equilibria, because ination rates di¤er.
To characterize the range of B in which our model admits the equilibria
ND, D and DD, we now dene two pairs of debt thresholds,

BL; BL
	
and
BA; BA
	
. Focusing on the rst pair: BL is dened as the minimum level
of B at which, if markets coordinate their expectations on anticipating a 100
per cent haircut in the low output state (and thus charge a destabilizing high
market rate RDB ), the government is indi¤erent between not defaulting and
validating ex post marketsexpectations (thus defaulting in the low output
state). This threshold is obtained from the counterpart of (15), written as
an equality and evaluated at the sovereign rate RDB :
 + 
RDBBL
1 + eDL + z
 
G+ 
RDBBL
1 + eDL   e
D
L
1 + eDL 
!
+ C
eDL (34)
= z

G+
RDBBL
1 + DL
  
D
L
1 + DL


+ C  DL  :
The second threshold in the pair, BL, is dened as the maximum level of B
at which, if markets expect no default and thus charge the risk free rate, the
government will be indi¤erent between default and no default in any state
of the world. The threshold BL is also obtained from (15), again written as
an equality but now evaluated at the sovereign rate RNDB :
 + 
RNDB BL
1 + eNDL + z
 
G+ 
RNDB BL
1 + eNDL   e
ND
L
1 + eNDL 
!
+ C
eNDL  (35)
= z

G+
RNDB BL
1 + NDL
  
ND
L
1 + NDL


+ C  NDL  :
Note that, when debt is above the threshold BL; the government would
default in the weak fundamental state even if markets charge the risk free
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rate: For B  BL, then, ND cannot be an equilibrium. The thresholds, BA
and BA are analogously dened except that default in state A occurs at
the minimum haircut rate dened in (28), rather than at 100 per cent we
omit the denitions to save space.
So, holding assumptions (17) through (18), our model admits a (rational-
expectations) ND equilibrium in which the government borrows at RNDB
and there is no default for 0 < B < BL; a D equilibrium in which the
government borrows at the rate RDB and default only occurs in the L state
for BL  B < BA; a DD equilibrium in which the government borrows
at RDDB ; and there is a 100 percent haircut in the low output state and
at least partial default in state A, for B  BA. When debt is above the
threshold BA; default in the intermediate state becomes inevitable, and the
D equilibrium no longer exists.
3.3 Uniqueness of ination versus self-fullling stealth de-
fault
An important result by Calvo (1988) is the possibility of self-fullling hikes
in interest rates driven by anticipations of debt debasement, i.e. stealth
default, via ination. In the context of our model, this possibility revolves
around the question of whether the ination rate is uniquely determined for
given equilibrium haircut rates, i.e., for a given equilibrium level of the in-
terest rate. A unique ination rate would indeed rule out the policy scenario
envisioned by Calvo. We now show that this is the case with convex costs
of ination.
To gain insight, consider the best-response of ination in the case of
no-default (27), rewritten here for convenience:
C0 (j) = z0( R
j
B
1 + i
B +G  i
1 + i
)
BRjB + 
(1 + i)
2 ; j = ND;D;DD
where the expressions for RjB are given by (31) through (33). Ination
uniqueness is ensured if the RHS of the above expression evaluated at
equilibrium accounting for the fact that RjB will be generally increasing
in expected ination is either decreasing in i, or increasing in i at a
rate slower than C 0 (i) on the LHS. This condition fails in Calvos seminal
contribution, essentially because C 0 (i) is not restricted to be positive.18
18 Indeed, in the Calvo model, ination multiplicity would disappear with convex costs,
as we posit in our analysis. Multiplicity essentially requires the cost of ination to be
bounded and/or a La¤er Curve for seigniorage revenues.
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The following lemma states that, with convexity of ination costs, in-
ation rates are uniquely determined in our equilibria. For the sake of
analytical tractability, the lemma is stated in reference to equilibria where
the default rate is at a corner, either zero or 100 percent.
Lemma 2 For optimal haircut rates equal to either 0 or 100 percent, with
convex costs of ination, the ination rates are unique in the equilibria
ND;D;DD.
Proof. See the appendix.
We stress that our analysis by no means dismisses the main lesson of
Calvo (1988) rather, it casts new light on it. Namely, belief-driven hikes in
interest rates on public debt rooted in the discretionary behavior of monetary
authorities cannot occur if the costs of ination rise su¢ ciently fast in the
policymakerspreferences. They may occur (independently of self-fullling
expectations of outright default) if ination costs are su¢ ciently at.19
3.4 Multiple equilibria for intermediate levels of sovereign
debt
While our assumptions guarantee that the rst pair

BL; BL
	
is strictly
below

BA; BA
	
, they do not restrict the ranking of the thresholds within
each pair. The equilibrium would be unique if BL < BL and BA < BA. To
have multiplicity, it must be that either BL > BL or BA > BA, or both.
Specically, forB comprised in the range betweenBL andBL, an equilib-
rium with no default (ND) coexists with another equilibrium with sovereign
risk (D). In this range, theD equilibrium is non-fundamental,in the sense
that default in L is determined by market expectations, and would not occur
if investors have bought government debt at the risk-free rate RNDB . The
D equilibrium instead becomes fundamental for higher Bs, since then
the nancing need of the government are high enough that the government
would default under macroeconomic stress even if investors bought debt at
RNDB . For B comprised between BL and BA, moreover, the (fundamental)
D equilibrium is also unique: there is no other equilibrium in which the
government would nd it optimal to repudiate debt in better states of the
economy than the weak one. Default in more states of the world becomes
19A key implication for policy is worth stressing. Contrary to popular arguments, low
social costs of ination provide no rm foundations for the central bank to rule out non-
fundamental sovereign debt crises, since high tolerance for ination may feed self-fullling
beliefs of stealth (inationary) default.
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instead a possibility for higher values of B; in the range comprised between
BA and BA. The D equilibrium with fundamental default in the weak out-
put state coexists with a DD equilibrium, where self-fullling expectations
precipitate (non-fundamental) default also under average macroeconomic
conditions.
Below, we set the stage of the analysis by proving that BL > BL and
BA > BA in the limiting case of i ! 0. Then, we reconsider multiplicity
with positive ination. We will show that ination and seigniorage do a¤ect
the debt range over which multiplicity obtains but the option to inate
debt away does not necessarily rule out the possibility of self-fullling non-
fundamental sovereign crises.
3.4.1 Multiplicity in the limiting case i ! 0
In our model, multiplicity always obtains when i ! 0 in all states of the
world for all values of debt.20 This case is analytically equivalent to assuming
that debt is (indexed) real and seigniorage is zero, as in the rst section of
Calvo (1988) and in Lorenzoni and Werning (2014) we can naturally map
our contribution in this literature.
Proposition 3 With i ! 0, BL > BL and BA > BA, and there is multi-
plicity between the ND and the D equilibrium, and between the D and the
DD equilibrium, all equilibria being well-behaved.
Proof. To show that BL > BL, we note that, as ination is zero in equi-
librium, there is no seigniorage revenue and, by (19) bTL G = 0. Moreover,
RDB =

(1 )+ > . Combining the equations determining BL and BL we
obtain:
 = z
 
G+ BL
  z  G+ BL  BL (36)
= z

G+

(1  ) + BL

  z

G+

(1  ) + BL

  
(1  ) + BL;
The expressions on the rst and the second lines are both increasing in B:
this follows from the fact that when bTL G = 0; taxes and distortions under
no default and full default are always larger than under partial default see
(16). Since the sovereign (real) rate is higher when agents anticipate default,
if evaluated at the same level of B, the expression on the second line would
20The proof can be easily generalized to the case in which i converges to a constant
value.
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be bigger than the expression on the rst line: it must be that BL > BL.
To establish that the D and the ND equilibria (both admissible for B within
the two thresholds) are well-behaved, we note that, as (31) and (32) are
constant when i ! 0, the ex-ante interest rate payments RjBB are always
increasing in B for j = ND;D.
To show that BA > BA, we combine the equations determining these
thresholds for i ! 0, to write:
[(1  ) + ]

T^A  G

>

(1  ) +  1  DDA   T^A  G (37)
where DDA solves (28) in state A. The above inequality is always satised
because DDA is strictly positive, i.e., 
DD
A > 0. The second term in the
inequality is also larger than BL by Assumption 1, implying BA > BL.
This equilibrium is well behaved as Assumption 2 ensures that RDDB B =
(1 a)B (T^A G)
1 a +(1 ) is increasing in B.
An important property of multiplicity that, to our knowledge, has not
been noted so far in the literature is summarized by the following remark.
Remark 4 For  ! 0 the lower range of multiplicity [BL; BL) has size
 (1  )BL; where  (1  ) is (approximately) the spread between the non-
fundamental and the fundamental values of the sovereign rate RDB and R
ND
B .
For  > 0; the upper range of multiplicity [BA; BA) has size 
DD
A

T^A  G

=,
proportional to the (minimum) spread between the non-fundamental and the
fundamental value of the sovereign rate, RDDB and R
D
B . This spread is ap-
proximately equal to the term DDA , which, with an endogenous haircut
rate, is the post-default primary surplus in state A,

T^A  G

.
In other words: there is a strict relation between the size of the multiplic-
ity range and the size of the spread in interest rates across the fundamental
and non-fundamental equilibria. By way of instance, with only xed default
costs and no fundamental default, as in Lorenzoni and Werning (2014), the
range [BL; BL) will generally be larger, the larger the spread between R
D
B
and RNDB ; and the higher BL:
3.4.2 Multiplicity with state-contingent ination
Away from the limiting case i ! 0, monetary policy a¤ects the scal policy
trade-o¤s. Since ination produces seigniorage revenues and unexpected
ination reduces the ex-post real burden of debt, conventional monetary
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policy contains taxes and tax-related output distortions and thus lowers the
costs of primary surplus adjustment relative to default.
Recall that the benevolent monetary authorities internalize the benet
from lowering tax distortions. In particular, this means that the higher the
elasticity of seigniorage revenue to ination, the more the central bank is
willing to raise ination, making outright default less attractive for scal
policymakers. In principle, if raising ination could generate a very large
amount of scal resources, seigniorage could eliminate multiplicity altogether
(see Calvo 1988 footnote 15 on page 656). For this to be the case, however,
the elasticity of seigniorage should be implausibly high implying that there
should be no La¤er curve for seigniorage.21
Multiplicity between the ND and D equilibrium Our considerations
above suggests that, since in our model seigniorage is increasing in ination
(as in Calvo 1988), multiplicity exists provided that  is not exceedingly
high. Moreover, recall that, to ensure that our equilibria are well-behaved,
Assumption 2 restricts the size of  to be not too large. For the sake of
tractability we state and prove the proposition on multiplicity below, further
restricting both parameters, i.e., under the su¢ cient condition ;  ! 0.
Under this condition, when the government chooses to default, the optimal
haircut rates will tend to 100 percent. Even if seigniorage revenues approach
zero, discretionary monetary authorities will still set positive ination rates
ex post, with the goal of reducing (if only at the margin) the burden of
government debt in real terms.
The following proposition states our main result, establishing a lower
multiplicity region for B.
Proposition 5 For ;  ! 0, BL < BL and the two equilibria ND and D
coexist and are well behaved for B in the range BL  B < BL:
Proof. See the appendix.
Multiplicity between the D and the DD equilibrium Omitting a
formal proposition and focus directly on the condition for multiplicity, we
21As argued by Bacchetta, Perazzi and Van Wincoop (2015), a similar result (that the
benets of ination are not enough to rule out multiplicity) carries over in models where
monetary policy is not neutral, and a monetary expansion can boost tax revenues and the
primary surplus also by improving economic activity, on top and above seigniorage.
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write the counterpart of (37) with non-zero ination rates:"
(1  ) 1 + bD
1 + DH
+ 
1 + bD
1 + DA
#"
T^A  G

+
bD
1 + bD 
#
> (38)"
(1  ) 1 + bDD
1 + DDH
+
 
1  DDA


#"
T^A  G

+
bDD
1 + bDD 
#
By the same logic of Proposition 5, it is easy to verify the inequality above
for ;  ! 0, whereas the minimum default threshold is DDA ! 1: Under
Assumption 2, the DD equilibrium is well behaved i.e., the ex-ante interest
rate bill RDDB B in nominal terms will be rising in the initial level of nominal
liabilities B. Namely, in the non-fundamental DD equilibrium:
BRDDB =
(1  )B  
h
T^A  G

+ ^
DD
1+^DD

i
(1 )(1 )
1+DDH
  
1+^DD
.
Provided  is not exceedingly large, 1    >  and 1+^DD
1+DDH
>  > 0 will
ensure that RDDB B is increasing in B.
In either case, multiple equilibria exist when the (ex-post) real spread
between the non-fundamental and the fundamental sovereign rate is positive:
the ND and the D equilibria co-exist when R
D
B
1+DL
>
RNDB
1+NDL
; the D and the
DD equilibria co-exist when R
DD
B
1+bDD > RDB1+bD . Observe that in both instances,
higher ination under default ex post does not compensate for the increase in
the nominal rate due to self-fullling anticipations of default in an additional
state L in the rst, A in the second range of multiplicity.
3.5 Numerical illustration
Figure 1 summarizes the main properties of our model economy in the ab-
sence of a successful backstop. The gure plots the interest costs of issuing
public debt, RBB, measured on the y-axis, against the initial nancing
need of the government, denoted by B, on the x-axis. As explained above,
the market interest rate RB in the gure is set by risk-neutral rational in-
vestors, forming expectations of taxation, default and ination one-period
ahead, knowing that policymaking is discretionary and (exogenous) macro-
economic conditions vary randomly.
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In the gure, the interest costs faced by the government are overall in-
creasing in B but not continuously so. Because default has xed costs, the
interest rate RB jumps up, marking a sharp increase in RBB, at the debt
thresholds BL and BA: There are three RBB lines. From the left to the
right, the lower line corresponds to the ND equilibrium; the middle to the
D equilibrium; the upper line to the right the DD equilibrium. These lines
have di¤erent slopes, steeper for higher interest costs line to the right of
the gure, and overlap over two ranges of B over which there is multiplicity
(marked by a shaded area). As the initial nancing need of the government
grows larger, the higher interest costs imply that the scal authority may
nd it optimal to default more, and in more states of the world, rather
than facing the economic distortions associated with adjusting the primary
surplus to service debt in all circumstances.
To draw Figure 1, we impose Assumptions 1 and 2, but abstract from
Assumption 3, which was motivated only on the grounds of analytical con-
venience. The primary surpluses in the L and A states are set equal to,
respectively, T^L G = 0.30, T^A G =0.52 (where G = 0 without loss of gen-
erality), and the maximum value of seigniorage equal to  = 0:50: Note that,
given the two-period structure of our model, these gures can be interpreted
in terms of present discounted values. That is, normalizing expected output
to 1, they can be read as, respectively, 30, 52 and 50 percent of expected
GDP. By the same token, B = 1 in the gure corresponds to 100 percent of
expected GDP. As long as endogenous ination is always close to zero in the
H state, outcomes in this state are practically irrelevant for the equilibria
we study. We then set T^H  G =2.22 (in line with the last inequality on the
right in Assumption 1) and the probabilities such that  = 1=2 and  = 0:2
(in line with Assumption 2). The sovereign rate spread over the risk free
rate is then around 10 percent in the D equilibrium, and 20 percent in the
DD equilibrium. The xed and variable costs of default are, respectively,
 = 0.1 (equal to 10 percent of expected GDP) and  = 0:1 (equal to 10
percent of GDP if total debt service is as high as GDP). The cost of ination
is assumed to be quadratic and equal to C () = 1:125 2: This implies that
an ination rate of 10 percent ( = 0:1) causes output costs (in present
discounted) equal to 1.1 percent of expected GDP. Similarly, tax distortions
are set to z (;Yi) =  i T 2i ; where 2  i  T^i = = (1  ) : By way of example,
this implies that in state A  A = 0:11 and, in present discounted value, the
output cost of a primary surplus of 50 percent of expected GDP is around 2.5
percent of expected GDP. From this parameterization, we obtain minimum
haircut rates around 75 percent in the L and the A state (precisely, L =
0.7904 and A =0.7230). As shown in the gure, equilibrium multiplicity is
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possible for B in the following ranges [1.07,1.15), and [1.39,1.49).
In the economic environment illustrated by Figure 1, our question is now
whether and how central bank interventions in the debt market can prevent
a rise in interest rates driven by arbitrary anticipations of outright default,
de facto eliminating the overlap between segments.
4 Ruling out bad equilibria with a credible mon-
etary backstop
When multiple equilibria are possible, social welfare is lower if markets co-
ordinate on the equilibrium with default in more states of the world. A
high interest bill driven by self-fullling expectations of default causes un-
warranted output and budget costs associated to non-fundamental default
when this occurs, but also with the need to raise distortionary primary sur-
pluses in states of the world where the government opts for servicing the debt
in full. The fact that equilibria with non-fundamental default are detrimen-
tal to social welfare motivates the search for e¤ective backstop policies.
In this section we analyze the workings of monetary backstops, whereby
the central bank announces that it will stand ready to purchase an amount of
public debt !B if agents coordinate their expectations on non-fundamental
default. As is customary in the literature, we posit that market coordina-
tion across equilibria is regulated by a mechanism akin to a tra¢ c-signal
device that switches between red and green: when red appears, agents co-
ordinate their expectations on the non-fundamental equilibrium, provided
this equilibrium exists (see e.g. Evans, Honkapohja and Romer (1998)). If
the central bank backstop policy is successful, however, the very announce-
ment of debt purchases rules out the non-fundamental interest rate as an
equilibrium outcome, and markets expectations cannot but coordinate on
the unique fundamental equilibrium.
Debt purchases do not need to be carried out in equilibrium, but, to have
the desired e¤ect, the policy announcement has to be credible. Namely, the
backstop has to satisfy the requirement that, if debt purchases were to be
e¤ectively carried out, the ensuing outcome would be feasible, unique, and
welfare-improving from the vantage point of the policymakers. So, even if
balance sheet losses and/or the possibility of elevated ination as a con-
sequence of central bank purchases of debt are merely o¤-equilibrium out-
comes, their assessment is crucial to the design of a backstop policy. Should
central bank interventions result in expected welfare losses relative to a non-
fundamental equilibrium, the announcement of a backstop would clearly not
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be credible, hence would not have any inuence on markets expectations.
As discussed in Section 3, backstops can be implemented under di¤erent
regimes of scal and monetary interactions. We focus on the two polar as-
sumptions of either a consolidated or a separate budget constraint, whereby
the transfers by the central bank to the scal authorities are restricted to
be non-negative.
4.1 The central bank budget constraint is not binding (scal
backing)
Under either scal backing or a non-binding budget separation (CB = 0,),
any haircut on the bonds held by the central bank automatically generates
an equivalent increase in tax liabilities: haircuts reduce the central bank
transfer to the scal authority and may turn them negative. De facto, central
bank holdings of debt reduce the tax base(the outstanding stock of debt
held by private investors) on which the scal authority can impose haircuts
and produce net budget saving. Conditional on default, even accounting for
possible budget savings on variable default costs with CB  , a higher !
tends to translate into higher taxation and (given that when CB = 0 taxes
and ination comove positively under the optimal policy) higher output
distortions overall. But debt purchases reduce the overall cost of issuing debt
ex ante. Conditional on no default, a higher ! means that the government
has to generate lower primary surpluses, at lower social costs.
So, when CB = 0, central bank interventions unambiguously make the
resort to default less attractive for the scal policymaker: they raise tax
distortions under default, while still facilitating the full service of debt at
lower costs. To appreciate this point, consider debt levels in the multiplicity
range, BL  B < BL, where the two thresholds satisfy the condition for
full default in state L conditional on ! = 0. Posit that markets coordinate
expectations on an equilibrium with 100 percent haircut charging RDB : Cen-
tral bank purchases of debt by !B enter the condition for optimal default
in state L as follows:
  z  TDL   z eTDL + C  DL   C eDL   RDB
1 + eDL (1  !)B (39)
where taxes are given by
eTDL = G  eDL
1 + eDL + R
D
B + !
 
RD   RDB

1 + eDL B
TDL = G 
DL
1 + DL
+
RDB   !
 
RDB  RD

1 + DL
B;
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and ination rates under central bank interventions are determined by the
counterparts of (11) in Section 3. For RDB > R
D > RDB , eTDL and eDL are
increasing in !, while TDL and 
D
L are decreasing in !: larger debt purchases
unambiguously reduce the expression on the right-hand side of the inequality
(39).
Given the xed cost  > 0; a su¢ ciently large amount of interventions
will overturn the scal policy decisions to default. The following proposition
synthesizes our main result for the lower multiplicity region.
Proposition 6 Assume that there is a range of debt BL  B < BL; where
BL and BL are dened in (34) and (35), respectively, for which both equi-
libria ND and D exist. Then there exists a minimum level of announced
purchases, 1 > !L (B) > 0; for which the only equilibrium is ND. Su¢ cient
conditions are that ! 0 or i ! 0:
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the second multiplicity region BA  B < BA; matters are somewhat
complicated by the fact that the haircut rate in state A is endogenous when
default is interior. Since interventions reduce the stock of liabilities held by
private investors, when choosing to default the government may optimally
impose a higher haircut rate. This is apparent in the limiting case i ! 0.
The equation determining A conditional on ! > 0 is:
 = z
0@G+

T^A  G

  (1  ) A!B
1  (1  ) A
1A z T^A A

T^A  G

  !B
1  (1  ) A
:
Since z0 () > = (1  ), the expression on the right hand side of the equa-
tion falls with an increase in !. Therefore, the endogenous haircut threshold
A will have to rise with ! in order for the expression to hold with equality.
As long as default is interior (A < 1), the fact that the haircut rate
unambiguously rises with ! means that interventions exert opposing e¤ects
on the overall cost of debt. On the one hand, central bank purchases lower
the interest rate on !B below market rates. On the other hand, market
rates on (1  !)B rise since agents anticipate a higher haircut.22
But once interventions are large enough, A reaches its upper bound
equal to 1: if the government decides to default in state A; the optimal
haircut rate will invariably be 100 percent. At that point, the same logic of
22 In the limiting case of i ! 0, we can show that, as long as default is interior,
increasing the scale of interventions ! initially raises, then lowers the debt threshold
BA (!) : To wit: with ! > 0, the lower threshold BA is determined by the following
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Proposition 6 also applies to the higher multiplicity region. For interventions
on a su¢ cient scale that A = 1; there will be a minimum size of debt
purchases by the central bank that will result in an unique equilibrium
without default in state A.
Relative to the non-fundamental DD-equilibrium, the economy is better
o¤ not only in the D-equilibrium, but also o¤ equilibrium if the central
bank actually carries out debt purchases in the rst period, in response to
markets anticipating default in both the L and the A states. This follows
from the fact that, o¤the equilibrium path interventions prevent debt service
from rising with the high rates charged by the market: the economy does
not incur the suboptimal costs of default in state A, and ination and taxes
are lower in all states of the world.23
Figures 2a,b illustrate these results based on our numerical example in
reference to the two regions of multiplicity shown Figure 1. The upper panel
of the gure plots the minimum level of interventions required to eliminate
multiplicity. The lower panel reports (ex ante) welfare conditional on no
intervention (! = 0) and conditional on the minimum-level interventions
shown in the panel above. Two features of the numerical example stand
out. First, multiplicity over the relevant range disappears for values of !
between 1/4 and 1/2 corresponding to debt purchases targeting between
25 and 50 percent of the initial nancing need of the government. Second,
welfare conditional on actual (minimum) interventions is always higher than
welfare in a non-fundamental equilibrium conrming that the minimum-
intervention backstop is feasible and welfare-improving as o¤-equilibrium
outcome.
expression
BA =
[(1  ) + (1  A) ]

T^A  G

=
[1  (1  ) A] + ! [(1  ) A    (1  (1  A))]
:
The coe¢ cient multiplying ! in the denominator is negative for A ! 0 and positive
for A ! 1; hence the debt threshold BA will be initially increasing, then will become
decreasing, as the central bank picks higher !0s, until A = 1:
23Observe that very large debt purchases by the central bank may increase the threshold
for fundamental default in state L up to the point in which, conditional on central bank
interventions, the equilibrium may feature no default in any state. But to the extent that
the two multiplicity regions are further from each other (as they are in our specication),
there will be some level of interventions that will rule out non-fundamental default in state
A without ruling out fundamental default in state L.
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4.2 The central bank budget constraint is binding (budget
separation)
The transmission mechanism by which a backstop operates is radically di¤er-
ent under budget separation, with a binding constraint (CB 6= 0). Namely,
central bank purchases of debt no longer reduce the tax basefor a default.
By contrast, they raise the possibility of high ine¢ cient ination. This is
because, if only o¤ equilibrium, debt purchases may result in balance sheet
losses implying that, in case of default, the monetary authorities will have
to deviate from the optimal policy and run the printing press at ine¢ ciently
high rates. The question is whether such deviation impinges on the credi-
bility of backstops.
Relative to the case of budget consolidation, high prospective ination
in case of default reduces welfare conditional on interventions: since mon-
etary authorities cannot pursue their e¢ cient policy plans, distortions are
no longer optimally smoothed across policy instruments, and ination is
ine¢ ciently high. But exactly for this reason, as long as preferences over
ination are su¢ ciently similar across policy makers, the large output dis-
tortions from high prospective ination also weigh on the decision to default
by the scal authority. Indeed, the main result of this section is that, as long
as scal policymakers are su¢ ciently averse to ination, the consequences
of budget separation for the conduct of monetary policy act as a deterrent
against outright debt repudiation.
Focus rst on the low multiplicity region, for BL  B < BL. As long
as no default takes place, the central bank budget constraint does not bind:
debt purchases by the central bank result in lower taxes and lower ination
(and thus a lower costs of debt servicing), as in the case with budget consol-
idation. This is apparent from inspecting the government budget constraint
under no default when markets charge the destabilizing interest rate RDB ;
and the optimality conditions for ination, rewritten below for convenience:
TDi = G 
Di
1 + Di
+
RDB
1 + Di
(1  !)B +

RDB
1 + Di

!B;
 
1 + Di
2 C0  Di  = z0  TDi  + (1  !)BRDB + !BRD :
When default occurs and the central bank constraint binds, instead,
debt purchases have opposing e¤ects on taxes and ination. By the budget
constraints of the two policy authorities evaluated under full default DL = 1,
a larger ! results in lower taxation (due to savings on the variable costs of
32
default), but higher ination (as the monetary authorities need to run the
printing press to honor their nominal liabilities at face value):
eTDL = G+  RDB
1 + eDL (1  !)B;
eDL  !RDB:
To appreciate the consequences on the default decision by scal author-
ities, reconsider condition (39) imposing that the central bank constraint
binds (i.e. eDL = !RDB). By this condition, the scal authorities only
choose debt repudiation in state L if the cost of defaulting is lower than the
cost of servicing debt in full:
  z  TDL + C  DL +
 z

G+ 
RDB
1 + !R
DB
(1  !)B

   R
D
B
1 + !R
DB
(1  !)B   C
!

RDB

:
Observe that a larger ! implies lower TDL and 
D
L and a higher eDL ; therefore,
for  ! 0, higher purchases reduce the cost of servicing debt in full over
the cost of defaulting. Furthermore, with ! ! 1; the right-hand side of the
above inequality has to be lower than  by construction: TDL and 
D
L are set
to service the debt at the risk-free rate RD, while eDL must be higher than
its optimal counterpart under default (obviously barring the possibility that
seigniorage is so high that the central bank constraint does not bind). So,
unless the costs of ination are either bounded or downplayed by the scal
authorities (and/or seigniorage revenues are unrealistically high and elastic
to ination), there will be a threshold above which debt purchases by the
central bank rule out multiplicity.
The same argument applies for level debt in the higher multiplicity re-
gion, BA  B < BA. In this range, when the central bank is constrained,
taxes and ination under non-fundamental default in state A are given by
bTA  G = [1  A (1  )] RDDB1 + A (1  !)B + [1  A] RB1 + A!B;
A =
 
RDD   (1  A)RB

!B:
For a given A, debt purchases by the central bank reduce overall taxation
and increase ination under default. But now debt purchases (and their
inationary consequences in case of default) also impinge on the minimum
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threshold A. Moreover, even when successfully ruling out non-fundamental
default in state A, central bank purchases still carry the risk of balance
sheet losses due to fundamental default in state L. While these complica-
tions do not substantially alter our conclusions, they make the analytical
characterization of the minimum intervention levels required to rule out the
DD equilibrium quite cumbersome. Therefore, we illustrate our main result
via a numerical example.
Figure 3a,b illustrate the e¤ects of interventions under budget separa-
tion based on the same parameterization and layout of the previous gure.
The upper panel shows the minimum level of interventions required to elim-
inate multiplicity. The lower panel reports ex ante welfare conditional on
no intervention (! = 0) and conditional on the successful (minimum-level)
interventions shown in the panel above.
As in Figure 2, welfare conditional on actual (minimum) interventions
is always higher than welfare in a non-fundamental equilibrium conrming
that the minimum-intervention backstop is feasible and welfare-improving
also under budget separation. There is however a notable di¤erence relative
to the previous gure: multiplicity over the relevant range disappears for
values of ! between 1/20 and 1/10, much lower than in the case of a consol-
idated budget constraint. The reason is clearly spelt out in our analysis in
this section: provided scal authorities are adverse to ination and budget
separation is an inexible (hence credible) rule, budget separation does not
undermine at all monetary backstops. Committing the central bank to be
responsible for its own budget constraint can actually strengthen its ability
to backstop government debt.
4.3 Discussion
There are a number of factors and considerations that are to be taken into
account in the design of a successful backstop. We have already discussed
a crucial one in Subsection 3.3, concerning the possibility of multiplicity in
equilibrium ination rates in the conclusion below we will briey consider
the possibility of non-market interventions by the central bank, e.g. mea-
sures a¤ecting banksreserves. Here we briey discuss the issue of whether a
backstop could feed opportunistic behavior by the scal authority in equilib-
rium, exacerbating scal fragility and therefore the likelihood of (fundamen-
tal) default.24 Moral hazardis a widely-debated issue that would require
24We have seen above that, o¤-equilibrium, the actual implementation of debt purchases
may a¤ect the optimal default rate in the case of an interior solution. The elasticity of  to
! is however irrelevant in the equilibrium allocation resulting from a successful backstop.
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extensive analysis; we limit our discussion to a basic consideration.
Conceptually, backstops are distinct from bailouts, that take the form
contingent transfers occurring with positive probability. The literature has
long claried that, acting as market coordination devices, backstops may ac-
tually strengthen the incentives for a government to undertake costly actions
that improve economic resilience to scal stress the opposite of the moral
hazard consequences of a bailout (see Morris and Shin 2006, Corsetti et
al. 2005, Corsetti and Dedola 2011 and Nicolini et al. 2014 among others).
This is because, without a backstop, the possibility of belief-driven crises
tends to reduce the expected future benets from these actions.
Nonetheless, a backstop does not necessarily eliminate fundamental de-
fault. With weak fundamentals creating scal stress, a central bank may face
the risk of being drawn into quite a di¤erent policy regime, one of ex-post
debt monetization à la Sargent and Wallace (1981), which may threaten its
independence and ability to deliver on its objectives. Minimizing this risk
is a rst-order issue in the design of institutional arrangements supporting
backstop policies. Yet this risk is not an argument for barring monetary
backstops independently of a proper assessment of the trade-o¤s between
the social and economic costs of ination versus belief-driven debt crises.
A further issue is why central banks do not engage more systematically in
the sovereign debt market, to ensure that government debt is non-defaultable
in nominal terms under any circumstances. The public nance literature has
shown that even when the government is benevolent and can commit, under
some circumstances it is optimal for the scal authorities to manipulate ex-
post the value of (non-contingent) government bonds, see, e.g., Adam and
Grill (2011). An intriguing direction of research may build on the obser-
vation that eliminating default under any circumstances through monetary
interventions may not be e¢ cient.
5 Conclusions
This paper has reconsidered the question of whether and how a central bank
can rule out self-fullling sovereign debt crises. Our model highlights crucial
conditions. Firstly, a monetary backstop rests on the ability of the central
bank to issue liabilities at a lower interest rate than a government subject to
default risk. In our analysis, successful intervention strategies translate into
a swap of (default-) risky government debt with nominal liabilities which
can always be redeemed against currency. Secondly, monetary policymak-
ers should be su¢ ciently averse to ination, so that monetary policy is not
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itself a source of multiple equilibria in ination and interest rates. Namely,
conditional on a realized haircut, ination rates should be uniquely deter-
mined, ruling out the possibility of high interest rates and taxation in the
presence of sound scal fundamentals and no default. Lastly, either the
scal authorities provide backing to the monetary authorities to pre-
vent prospective balance sheet losses in case of fundamental default to force
the central bank to run ine¢ cient ination or, barring any form of scal
backingof the central bank, the scal authorities are themselves su¢ ciently
averse to ination, and internalize the inationary costs of default in their
decision making.
Our results are at odds with views often voiced in the public debate,
claiming that the central bank can freely play the role of lender of last
resort to the government because, alternatively, a central bank can always
consolidate its liabilities and force private banks to hold them indenitely,
or debase them by a bout of unexpected ination. In light of our analysis,
both views have fundamental weaknesses. The latter view stressing the need
for the central bank to impose nancial repression over private banks by
forcing them to hold reserves, de facto introduces the possibility of default
on monetary liabilities, without however working out its consequences. If
the central bank is expected to tamper with its liabilities, it is easy to see
that the arbitrage condition relating the rate on monetary liabilities and
the risk free rate would have to include terms in the anticipated central
banks haircut CBi : the optimal monetary policy would have to account for
the optimal haircut on the holders of reserves. The logic of self-fullling
beliefs would then apply to a discretionary central bank as well as to the
government.
The alternative, inationary-debasement view downplays the social costs
of running high ination, historically conducive to nancial and macro in-
stability. If anything, in line with Calvo (1988), our analysis suggests that
downplaying the costs of ination may actually raise the prospects of self-
fullling sovereign debt crises driven by expectations of debt debasement,
rather than outright default. Our analysis calls attention on the non-trivial
fact that, exactly because high ination is costly, a monetary backstop is
credible even under budget separation. Most importantly, ination rates
are higher in an equilibrium with belief-driven outright defaults: an e¤ec-
tive monetary backstop prevents high (let alone runaway) ination, rather
than creating price instability.
An important conclusion from our analysis is that a shared objective
function among scal and monetary authorities (or enough aversion to in-
ation costs by the scal authority) greatly facilitates the implementation
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of a monetary backstop. As each authority internalizes the e¤ects of own
policy choices on overall distortions, a monetary backstop is e¤ective under
reasonably mild conditions, even when the central bank is held responsible
for its own balance sheet losses, barring contingent scal transfers under any
circumstance. It follows that the conditions for a monetary backstop to be
credible may be stricter when political economy or distributional consider-
ations cause the two authorities to trade-o¤ self-interested objectives with
socially e¢ cient policies.
Although we have developed our model from the perspective of a na-
tional economy with an independent currency, our analysis bears lessons
for a currency union. In a monetary union among essentially independent
states, national governments may pursue conicting, inward-looking objec-
tives and/or be adverse to extending large-scale scal backing to the common
central bank. In case of budget separation, the inationary consequences
from budget losses due to default by one country may be quite contained
and, most importantly, are di¤use through the entire currency union. This
means that a national scal authority choosing to default may not face
the full inationary costs of its decision. Even under these circumstances,
however, a common central bank can still engineer a successful backstop to
member states, to the extent that, as is the case for the OMTs in the euro
area, governments have access to the benet of a backstop only provided
that they agree to strict conditionality, ensuring stability of public nances
and possibly eliciting stricter cross-border cooperation.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Uniqueness of ination
We prove uniqueness of ination for the ND, D and DD equilibrium in
turn, assuming that, when default occurs, the haircut rate is 100 percent.
Consider rst the ND equilibrium (with no default) whereas
RNDB =

(1  )
1 + NDH
+

1 + NDA
+
 (1  )
1 + NDL
and, for a given interest rate RB, the ination reaction functions are given
by:
C0 (i) (1 + i) = z0( RB
1 + i
B+G  i
1 + i
;Yi)

RB
1 + i
B +

1 + i

; i = H;A;L:
The equations above uniquely dene i (RB) with
@i (RB)
@RB
> 0 for C () ; z ()
convex, as the right hand side falls while the left-hand side increases with
i. Observe that L (RB) > A (RB) > H (RB) ; given our assumptions on
z0(;Yi); and that 0  i (RB = 0) <1:
The equilibrium rate RNDB is dened by the following xed point:
V (RB)  (1  )
1 + H (RB)
+

1 + A (RB)
+
 (1  )
1 + L (RB)
= RB;
where V (RB) > 0 when RB = 0: To show that the xed point exists and is
unique, observe that the following inequality holds:
V (RB)  (1  )
1 + H (RB)
+

1 + A (RB)
+
 (1  )
1 + L (RB)
  [1 + L (RB)] ;
where the left-hand side and right-hand side are both increasing in RB:
Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for V (RB) to have a unique xed point at
0 < RNDB  RB is that there exists a unique RB such that
RB =  [1 + L (R

B)] :
Setting RB =  (1 + L) in the ination reaction function in state L yields
a unique value L due to convexity of the functions C () and z () :
C0 (L) (1 + L) = z0(B +G  
L
1 + L
;YL)

B +

1 + L

;
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therefore we have that RB =  (1 + 

L) =  [1 + L (R

B)] : This establishes
that V (RB) also has a unique xed point.
Consider now the D equilibrium, with full default in state L, in which
the sovereign interest rate is given by RDB =

(1  )
1 + DH
+

1 + DA
; and the
ination reaction functions in states A and H under no default, (27), are
given by:
C0  DA  1 + DA = z0( (1  ) D + B +G  DA1 + DA ;YA)


(1  ) D + B +

1 + DA

C0  DH  1 + DH = z0( D(1  ) D + B +G  DH1 + DH ;YH)

D
(1  ) D + B +

1 + DH

;
where D is dened as the ratio of ination in the A and the H state, D 
1+DA
1+DH
: According to these equations Di i = A;H are uniquely determined as
a function of D; since under convexity of the ination costs C () the left-
hand side is increasing in Di ; while the right-hand side is decreasing in 
D
i .
Namely, the equations implicitly dene the two functions Di = fi
 
D

;
where fH (fA) is increasing (decreasing) in D as
D
(1  ) D +  is also
increasing (and


(1  ) D + 

is decreasing) in D: In turn, these
functions dene the following mapping of D into itself:
D =
 
1 + DA
 
1 + DH
 = 1 + fA  D
1 + fH (D)
 g  D ;D 2 (0;1) :
Therefore, if we can show that g
 
D

has a unique xed point, this would
establish uniqueness of Di i = A;H: Observe rst that for 
D ! 0;
limD!0 fA
 
D

> limD!0 fH
 
D

; since the right-hand side of the in-
ation reaction function evaluated at the same ination rate for D ! 0 is
always higher in state A than in state H:
z0(


B+G  
1 + 
;YA)



B +

1 + 

> z0(G  
1 + 
;YH)


1 + 

;
while the left-hand side is the same. This implies that limD!0 g
 
D

>
1 > 0. By the same token, D !1; limD!1 g
 
D

< 1 as limD!1 fA
 
D

<
limD!1 fH
 
D

: Hence, the mapping g
 
D

has at list one xed point.
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Then a su¢ cient condition for the uniqueness of this xed point is that
g
 
D

is decreasing in D: This is the case if fH
 
D

is decreasing and
fA
 
D

is increasing, a fact that we have already established above. There-
fore Di i = A;H are uniquely determined, and so is R
D
B : Finally, as R
D
B does
not depend on it, the following uniquely solves for ination in state L:
C0 (eL) = z0(
RDB
1 + eLB +G  eL1 + eL;YL)  BRDB + + BRDB
(1 + eL)2 :
This establishes that ination rates in the D equilibrium, Di i = H;A;L;
are unique.
Finally, consider theDD equilibrium, whereRDDB =

(1  )
1 + DDH
+


1  bDDA 
1 + bDD
:
When bDDA = DDA = 1, the same argument just used for the D equilibrium
immediately applies, since the following equation has a unique solution for
DDH :
C0  DDH   1 + DDH  = z0( 1  B+G  DDH1 + DDH ;YH)


1  B +

1 + DDH

;
therefore ination rates are uniquely determined.
6.2 Multiplicity between the ND and the D equilibrium with
state-contingent ination
The condition for multiplicity of ND and D equilibria with ; ! 0 is:
 = z

G+
RNDB
1 + NDL
BL

  z (G) + C  NDL   C eNDL 
< z

G+
RDB
1 + DL
BL

  z (G) + C  DL   C eDL ;
where sovereign bond rates are dened as:
RNDB =

(1 )
1+NDH
+ 


1+NDA
+ 1 
1+NDL
 ;
RDB =

(1 )
1+DH
+ 
1+DA
;
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and, because of full default and no seigniorage revenue, ination is set
at the value that minimizes its cost C 0
eNDL  = C 0 eDL = 0, implying
C
eNDL  = C eDL : Therefore we can rewrite the condition for multiplic-
ity as follows:
z

G+
RNDB
1 + NDL
BL

+ C  NDL  < zG+ RDB1 + DL BL

+ C  DL  ;
where ination rates are (uniquely) determined according to the following
reaction functions: 
1 + NDL
 C0  NDL  = z0G+ RNDB1 + NDL BL

RNDB
1 + NDL
BL
 
1 + DL
 C0  DL  = z0G+ RDB1 + DL BL

RDB
1 + DL
BL:
Here, NDL is an equilibrium ination rate, while 
D
L represents a best de-
viation, so RDB does not depend on it. Observe that
RDB
1+DL
>
RNDB
1+NDL
<=>
DL > 
ND
L ; as the function on the left-hand sides, l ()  (1 + ) C0 () ;
is increasing in ; and the function on the right-hand side, r

RB
1+B


z0 (;YL) RB1+B; is increasing in the ex-post real rate RB1+ . Therefore, if
RDB
1+DL
>
RNDB
1+NDL
(and because DL > 
ND
L ; equivalently if R
D
B > R
ND
B ) then there will
be multiplicity. Thus we only need to show that RDB > R
ND
B ; namely, since
 (1  ) 1+NDi
1+NDL
> 0, i = A;H we have to show that:
(1  )
1 + DH
+

1 + DA
 (1  )
1 + NDH
+

1 + NDA
:
which is veried if Di  NDi i = A;H. Consider rst ination determina-
tion in the ND equilibria, in the states A and H: 
1 + NDA
 C0  NDA 
= z0
0@G+ 
(1 ) 1+
ND
A
1+ND
H
++(1 ) 1+
ND
A
1+ND
L
BL
1A 
(1 ) 1+
ND
A
1+ND
H
++(1 ) 1+
ND
A
1+ND
L
BL
 
1 + NDH
 C0  NDH 
= z0
0@G+ 
(1 )+ 1+
ND
H
1+ND
A
+(1 ) 1+
ND
H
1+ND
L
BL
1A 
(1 )+ 1+
ND
H
1+ND
A
+(1 ) 1+
ND
H
1+ND
L
BL:
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These equations determine NDi as a function of 
ND
L ; where 
ND
i is larger,
the larger NDL : This follows from the fact that the right-hand side of both
equations is increasing in NDL and 
ND
j , j 6= i: Therefore, NDi would
reach their maximum (but nite) value for NDL ! 1; for which the term
 (1  ) 1+NDi
1+NDL
! 0: But ination determination Di in the D equilibrium
can be thought of as exactly this limiting case, because under complete
default in state L the term  (1  ) 1+Di
1+eDL is multiplied by zero. Indeed it
does not appear in the ination reaction functions, which are otherwise the
same as those above:
 
1 + DA
 C0  DA = z0
0@G+ 
(1 ) 1+
D
A
1+D
H
+
BL
1A 
(1 ) 1+
D
A
1+D
H
+
BL
 
1 + DH
 C0  DH = z0
0@G+ 
(1 )+ 1+
D
H
1+D
A
BL
1A 
(1 )+ 1+
D
H
1+D
A
BL:
6.3 Existence of threshold for interventions in non-fundamental
D equilibrium
In the D equilibrium where the sovereign and the risk-free interest rates are:
RDB =

(1  )
1 + DH
+

1 + DA
RD =

(1  )
1 + DH
+

1 + DA
+
 (1  )
1 + eDL
;
optimal default in state L implies that the following inequality holds:
 < z
 
TDL
  z eTDL + C  DL   C eDL   RDB
1 + eDL (1  !)B; (40)
whereas we assume that this inequality holds for ! = 0 in the multiplicity
range BL  B < BL: Taxes are given by the budget constraints under full
default
eTDL  and under full repayment  TDL :
eTDL = G  eDL
1 + eDL +  (1  !)R
D
B + !R
D
1 + eDL B;
TDL = G 
DL
1 + DL
+
(1  !)RDB + !RD
1 + DL
B;
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while ination rates obey the reaction functions:
1 + eDL2 C0 eDL = z0 eTDL   + RDB (1  !) + !RDB
+ RDB (1  !)B; 
1 + DL
2 C0  DL  = z0  TDL   + RDB (1  !) + !RDB :
Observe that the last two equations determine ination rates, which in turn
determine taxes.
We need to show that there is a threshold 0 < ! (B) < 1 at which (40)
holds as an equality, implying that default is no longer optimal. As state
above, by assumption this inequality holds for BL  B < BL and ! = 0:
For ! ! 1; the right-hand side of the inequality goes to zero, becoming
lower than : Therefore, we only need to show that the right-hand side
is a decreasing function of !: A su¢ cient condition is that TDL ; 
D
L be de-
creasing in !; while eTDL ; eDL be increasing in !. Since RDB > RD; under full
repayment, debt service

RDB (1  !) + !RD

B decreases in !: It follows
that both TDL ; 
D
L are also decreasing in !, since a lower debt service will
translate into lower distortions at the margin. Debt costs under default,
RDB (1  !) + !RD

B; fall with ! if and only RD > RDB , namely:
(1  )

(1  )
1 + DH
+

1 + DA

>  (1  ) 1
1 + eDL :
When eDL  Di this condition is always veried under Assumption 2, as
1       > 0; this is the case when i ! 0: Obviously,  ! 0 is another
su¢ cient condition holding for any ination rate.
Finally, it is apparent that welfare is higher o¤ the equilibrium path
with interventions at the threshold ! (B) than in the D equilibrium with
! = 0, since o¤-equilibrium the central bank interventions lower the debt
costs, implying lower taxes and ination, and the economy is spared default
costs.
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